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COMPETITIVE WEAPON SYSTEMS ACQUISITION:
MYTHS AND FACTS
ABSTRACT
After all the publicity about defense procurement scandals,
the Administration, Congress, and the general public have been
pushing to open defense acquisition to more competition. Congress
enacted The Competition in Contracting Act of 1984. This report
attempts to separate the myths from the facts of weapon system
competition. It is unfortunate that many policy analyses, and many
major acquisition decisions, were based on the myth that competing
weapon systems should produce significant savings to the govern-
ment. The fact is that dual source competition in major systems
has resulted in additional costs to the government almost as often
as it has produced savings. Theoretical explanations and empirical
evidence are presented to shed some light on this major policy
issue.
This report summarizes the salient findings from a series of
competition-related studies which we conducted for the Naval Air
Systems Command Cost Analysis Division. We found a common thread
in these studies which has implications for major systems
acquisition policy making and the direction of future competition-
related policy studies.

COMPETITIVE WEAPON SYSTEMS ACQUISITION:
MYTHS AND FACTS
After publicity concerning $640 toilet covers, $436 hammers
and other procurement problems, the U.S. Administration, Congress,
and the general public began pushing to open defense acquisition
to more competition. As a result, Congress enacted The Competition
in Contracting Act of 1984 1 . Due to this strong legislative and
political pressure, "Think Competition" has become a slogan in
defense acquisition circles, and dual source procurement has been
suggested as one means of obtaining additional competition.
The purpose of this report is to separate myths from facts in
weapon system competition. It is unfortunate that many policy
analyses, and many major acquisition decisions, were based on the
myth that competing weapon systems would produce significant
savings to the government.
The report is organized as follows: Section 1 describes the
pressure faced by the Department of Defense (DoD) to increase the
use of competition in procurement. Section 2 discusses the unique
DoD market environment, while Section 3 reviews prior studies which
demonstrate the paradox that competition has resulted in added net
costs to the government as often as it has produced the desired net
saving. Sections 4 and 5 present some theoretical and empirical
data that explain the paradoxical findings. Section 6 summarizes
myths and facts in weapon system competition and concludes with
directions for future study for acquisition policy and decision.
1. COMPETITION IN DEFENSE ACQUISITION
There is a deep-seated and historic belief that the best model
for government procurement is solicitation of price offers from a
maximum number of qualified sources. Indeed, there are many
advantages to the government of competitive procurement if it is
applied properly. Various imperatives for competition in defense
procurement will be discussed in this section.
Since 1809, Federal statutes, regulations, and executive
orders have consistently required that government procurement must,
to the greatest possible extent, be made on a competitive basis.
In 1965, the then Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara indicated
to the Joint Economic Committee (Hearings on the Economic Impact
of Federal Procurement) that the General Accounting Office (GAO)
had evidence of dollar savings on the order of 25 percent or more
when competition was introduced for reprocurement of an item which
had a sole-source procurement history. 2 Since then, this 25
percent savings figure has been quoted repeatedly by defense policy
makers and observers. In 1969, the Subcommittee on Priorities and
Economy in Government of the Joint Economic Committee called for
vastly expanded use of competition for procuring all forms of
Defense Department material. 3
This position has been reaffirmed both by the current
Administration and by Congress. The most recent legislation is
Public Law 98-369, which includes the Competition in Contracting
Act of 1984. PL 98-369 stipulates the use of dual sourcing by DoD
and civil agencies in procurement. The President's Blue Ribbon
Commission on Defense Management (a.k.a. the Packard Commission)
also strongly advocated the increased use of competition. 4 This
drive toward competitive procurement is reflected in various
internal DoD initiatives and programs.
2. DEFENSE MARKETS
Defense markets run the gamut from totally free competition
to a DoD-created market with one buyer and one or two suppliers;
from markets which provide many choices of product and product
attributes to one in which a product exists only because the DoD
has paid the price to create it. While a great majority of the 13
million annual procurement actions are conducted in a purely
competitive fashion, the majority of defense procurement dollars
have been spent in a market where the government is the only buyer
and the number of potential suppliers is small. 5
Competition in traditional markets arises when buyers and
sellers are numerous and individually so unimportant in the market
that their separate actions have no meaningful impact on market
price. A great majority of DoD procurement actions are in such a
market. However, the majority of procurement dollars are for major
weapon systems which poses a unique problem.
For major systems, the government is the only buyer. It
dictates the size of the market and the timing of demand. Addition-
ally, these systems usually involve state-of-the-art technologies,
and hence bear little relation to the infamous ubiquitous "widget"
which is produced and sold in traditional competitive markets.
Compounding these uncertainties to the supplier is the heavy
investment needed to become a supplier. In this kind of environ-
ment, the availability of suppliers may be linked to the willing-
ness of the government to absorb at least part of the risk, which
could mean that the government must incur investment cost to
develop a supplier in order to introduce a competitor. This is an
element which is unique to the major defense systems market and is
not well understood by those unfamiliar with the defense market.
Lack of understanding of the uniqueness of defense market con-
tributes to the allusion that competition in defense acquisition
always produces lower prices to the government.
3. GAINS AND LOSSES FROM PRIOR DUAL SOURCE COMPETITION
Since McNamara's statement about the 2 5 percent savings from
introducing a competitor, numerous studies had been conducted to
examine the financial consequences of dual source competition.
Earlier studies, with questionable methodologies, reported dramatic
savings from introducing a competitor. 6 Despite their questionable
methodologies, these studies were prominently cited as evidences
of savings from introducing competition to weapon systems. 7 With
the improvement in research methodologies, studies conducted in
recent years revealed that competition has resulted in added net
costs almost as often as it has produced the desired net savings.
A comprehensive survey of prior studies can be found in the litera-
ture8 and, therefore, will not be repeated here. We will pursue
the contradictory findings and provide additional insight on the
inconsistency
.
Although many dual-sourced weapon systems programs have been
studied, we will examine only those with verifiable data. Our
interests are not on predicting the size of dollar savings but on
pursuing the paradoxical finding that dual source competition has
resulted in added costs as well as net savings. Hopefully, these
efforts will provide some leads for the direction of future policy
analysis.
Table 1 lists seven dual-sourced programs which have been
examined closely in several studies. The program savings (losses)
data were taken from earlier studies, and the amount of savings
(losses) was calculated by comparing actual prices paid by the
government after the program was dual sourced to the amount that
would have been paid had the government continued sole source
procurement.
We examined the time period during which each program was in
the dual source competition mode, as shown in Column (3). The
aerospace industry's capacity utilization rate during the dual
source phase of each program is shown in Column (4) . Note that the
three programs realizing savings from dual sourcing were in the
dual source procurement phase when the aerospace industry's
capacity utilization rates were relatively low. On the other hand,
the other four programs, which resulted in losses, were in the dual
source procurement phase when the industry's capacity utilization
rates were relatively high. It should be apparent to the reader
that the likelihood of realizing savings or suffering losses from
dual sourcing a major weapon system is related to the business
environment of the industry.
[Insert Table 1 about here]
[Insert Figure 1 about here]
Figure 1 shows the same data in chronological order. From a
historical perspective, the three dual-sourced programs which
resulted in saving to the government (Bullpup, TOW, Rockeye)
coincided roughly with either the post-Korean-war era or the post-
Vietnam-war era. On the other hand, dual sourcing Sidewinder, MK-
46, and Shillelagh resulted in additional cost to the government
because they coincided with the height of the Vietnam war when the
aerospace and the ordnance industries were at their busiest since
WW II. It is clear that creating a second source as the "compet-
itive" supplier does not always result in a competitive environment
in an economic sense. Whether or not the government can realize
the benefit of competition depends on the timing of dual sourcing.
In the next two sections, we will provide additional insight to
illuminate this point.
4. CONTRACTORS' FORWARD-PRICING STRATEGIES
The analysis in the preceding section suggests that contrac-
tors adjust their bid prices according to the business environment
of their industry. Given the multitude of laws and regulations
governing the government contractors' cost accounting and pricing,
one might wonder how it is indeed possible to have varying levels
of prices. To understand why this .is possible, it is necessary to
understand the forward-pricing system used in defense and other
large civilian contracts.
Under the forward-pricing system, a bid price must be
submitted well in advance on the often highly uncertain estimated
cost to perform the contracted work. The uncertainty factor is
particularly serious for defense contracts, since most involve
state-of-the-art technologies. When the industry has ample idle
capacity, such as in a post-war era, a firm may be so eager to
compete for a contract that it will base its bid on an estimated
cost figure which it may only have a small chance of achieving.
Figure 2 depicts this decision scenario. 10 This hypothetical
example assumes that the estimated cost to complete a contract
ranges from the highly optimistic $50,000 (only 0.5% chance of
achieving this cost figure) to the worst case scenario of $150,000.
The top frame shows the estimated probability of occurrence of each
cost figure. The bottom frame shows the cumulative probability of,
or the chance to equal or better, a particular cost level.
[Insert Figure 2 about here]
Point A in the bottom frame of Figure 2 shows the estimated
cost if the contractor is willing to accept a 50:50 chance. The
corresponding cost estimate for the contract is approximately
$98,000. The contractor may add another 10% as his profit target
and submit a bid of $107,800 in the hope of winning the contract.
On the other hand, the contractors do not face any pressure
to submit a competitive bids if business conditions in the industry
improve and each firm has ample business opportunities. There are
several reasons for this. For one, during an economic boom, a
profit making firm is less likely to engage in price competition.
This reduced willingness to compete in price would be further
compounded if a contractor senses that other potential contractors
also share this reduced willingness to compete. A booming economy
also implies alternatives for the firm's production capacity.
Sufficient profit opportunity must exist in order to justify
capacity expansion, and, before the capacity can be expanded and
made operational, existing projects must compete with each other
for the limited capacity. Under all these circumstances, a
contractor will not submit a bid unless he/she is highly confident
that the estimated cost level can be equaled or bettered.
If the contractor desires a higher confidence level, say 75%,
the estimated cost would be approximately $110,000, as shown in
Point B in Figure 2. Adding a 10% profit target would bring the
bid price to $121,000, a much higher bid compared to the $107,800
when the economy is not as good. Therefore, there is a close
association between a contractor's bid price and the condition of
the economy. This deduction is consistent with the empirical
observation made in the preceding section that the potential for
the government to realize the benefit of weapon system competition
depends on the timing of dual sourcing.
5. STRUCTURAL DEFICIENCY OF DUAL SOURCE COMPETITION
Apart from the timing issue discussed above, there is a
structural deficiency in the way a major weapon system can be
procured competitively. Dual source competition allows the
contractor and the government opportunities to exploit the market
situation to the advantage of each party. The government's
objective, as reflected in PL 98-369 and other policy directives
cited earlier, is that competition will put competitive pressure
on the supplier and result in a fair price to both parties.
However, dual source competition also creates opportunities for the
contractor to exploit. First, in return for the competitive market
pressure with competitive bidding, the government gives up much of
the regulatory authority it enjoys over verification of the
contractor's cost and pricing data. Thus, it becomes easier for
the contractor to obtain higher profits under a dual source
competitive contract than under a sole source negotiated contract
if the market environment allows it. Second, in order to maintain
two sources of supply, it is necessary for the government to award
a minimum sustaining quantity to the higher-priced competitor.
Both of these factors put the government in a disadvantaged
position in dealing with the contractors. In this section, we will
discuss various pricing strategies that can be used by the
contractor to exploit the dual source competition situation. 11
The Minimum Sustaining Rate
In a dual source competition environment, the lower-priced
bidder is typically awarded the major portion of the annual
quantity, but the higher bidder is also awarded a quantity that
represents the minimum level of production the contractor requires
to stay in production and remain viable. This guarantee, resulting
from the government's desire to maintain two viable production
sources, actually diminishes competitive pressures and puts the
government in a disadvantaged position. Hence, there is no
competitive incentive for the suppliers at the minimum sustaining
quantity level, and the government can expect an inflated bid price
from both of the suppliers at this level.
The Production Rate Effect
Due to the splitting of the production quantity between the
two contractors, the government must forego some of the savings
associated with cumulative production experience. The smaller
production rate also means higher unit cost because neither
contractor is able to fully realize the economies of scale in
production. Therefore, the split award should result in higher
production costs to either of the two contractors than if the
entire year's production were awarded to the low bidder. The
10
argument for using dual source competition, of course, rests on the
assumption that the loss of economies of scale and cumulative
production experience should be more than offset by the smaller
amount of profit the contractor would be forced to accept under
competition. Therefore, it is usually suggested that the bid
prices should be lower under a competitive environment, compared
to a sole source acquisition, thus resulting in net savings to the
Government.
Unequal Competitive Position Between Contractors
If the second supplier is established after the first supplier
has had some production experience with the weapon system in
question, the competitive position of the two contractors most
likely will be unequal. Under this circumstance, the anticipated
competitive pressure from dual sourcing may diminish, or even
evaporate completely.
First of all, being the developer of the system and having had
some production experience, the first supplier often enjoys a cost
advantage over the new supplier. Other things being equal, the
more experienced producer will have a lower production cost and can
underbid the new supplier. This problem is compounded if the first
supplier continues to win the majority of annual quantities in a
dual award environment.
Second, there is a dilemma facing the government in establish-
ing the second supply source. Being the only buyer in the major
weapon system market, the government often has to provide financial
11
resources to induce other contractors to establish the production
facility for a particular weapon system. Expanding the capacity
beyond the level needed clearly is not economical. But the
combined production capacity of the two firms may far exceed the
actual requirements if the second source is established at the same
production capacity level as the original source. On the other
hand, if the second source's production capacity is established at
a level lower than the total government requirement, the second
source would not be in a position to bid at the higher percentages
of the annual requirement, thus creating a virtual monopoly for the
original source at higher quantities.
Evidence of Contractor Price Gaming
The various scenarios discussed in this section reflect the
structural deficiency of dual source competition, which presents
many opportunities for contractors to submit inflated bid prices.
This hypothesis is consistent with the forward-pricing strategy
discussed earlier in providing the explanation for the paradoxical
results of prior dual sourcing experience. To support our logical
hypothesis, we will present an actual case which reflects the price
gaming hypothesis discussed above.
Figure 3 shows the bid prices submitted by a contractor of a
major weapon systems under the dual source competition environment.
We have masked the identity of the program and contractor and the
numerical values of the data in order to protect the proprietary
information, but the relative scale of all prices is accurate.
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[Insert Figure 3 about here]
The circle on the left in Figure 3 is the actual unit price
awarded when the contractor was the sole source supplier. The
dashed line going through this circle and extending downward to the
right is the projected sole source price using the contractor's
historical price-reduction curve.
In dual source competition, the government annually solicits
bids from both suppliers for various quantity levels. The lower
price bidder is awarded the larger share of the government's annual
quantity requirements while the higher price bidder gets the
smaller share, usually the minimum sustaining rate to keep the
loser's plant active. The stars on the solid line represent the
bid prices for the respective quantity levels (from 20% to 80% of
total annual quantity at 10% increments, also known as the step-
ladder bids) submitted by the contractor in the first year of dual
source procurement. The triangles represent the second year bids.
For comparison, the dotted lines beneath the bid price curves
represent the reasonable step-ladder bids. On a log-log graph such
as Figure 3, these bids should form a downward sloping straight
line to reflect the production rate economies for larger quan-
tities. The dotted line should also intercept the dashed long-term
price reduction curve to reflect the effect of learning from
cumulative production experience. Comparing the step-ladder bids
to the respective reference line, one can observe several ir-
regularities in those annual bids.
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First, at the minimum sustaining rate (20%) level, the bids
for both Year 1 and Year 2 are far above the reasonable bid line,
indicating that the bid prices are too high at this quantity level.
This reflects the point made earlier that, at the minimum sustain-
ing rate level, there is no competitive pressure whatsoever and,
no matter who wins the larger share, the other contractor will be
a "happy loser."
Second, the bid prices went up for the 70% and 80% quantity
levels. As the reasonable bid price curves show, the higher the
quantity produced, the lower the unit price should be. Increasing
the bids at high quantity levels is not economically justifiable
and reflects the point made earlier that, if one contractor senses
no competitive pressure from the other side at that quantity level,
it can and will take advantage of the situation.
Another irregularity is that Year 2 bid prices were higher
than those in Year 1. Since the data have been adjusted for
inflation, it is reasonable to expect decreasing prices for
subsequent years because of the learning curve phenomenon typical
in the aerospace industry. These increasing prices are another




Due to the unique market structure, procurement of major
defense systems has been done primarily on a sole source basis.
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Current policy calls for expanded competition in procuring all
forms of defense systems and material. Dual competition has been
suggested as one means of obtaining competition in the major system
procurement. However, extensive study of prior dual source
competition experiences indicates that the results from this form
of competition have been mixed.
In this report, we have provided some conceptual and empirical
explanations for these paradoxical findings. Our attempt is to
separate the myths from the facts of major weapon system competi-
tion:
Myth: Dual source procurement is a competitive procurement.
Fact: In economic theory, competition implies that there is
a large number of suppliers and an individual supplier's action has
no significant impact on the market. Dual source procurement is
a classic case of duopoly which is, in fact, much closer to
monopoly than to competition.
Myth: Dual source "competition" will force the suppliers to
reduce their prices.
Fact: The primary condition under which the two suppliers in
a defense industry duopoly would engage in price competition is
when both are hungry for business, i.e., when the industry is in
a slump. Even in this case, both suppliers can inflate the bid
price at the minimum quantity without any penalty. Thus, at the
minimum sustaining rate under the dual source procurement structure
will always produce a "happy loser."
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Myth: Dual sourcing a previously sole-sourced weapon system
can produce savings on the order of 25% or more.
Fact: This myth was the direct result of McNamara's comment
and has been quoted repeatedly by Washington decision makers in the
past two decades. It is possible that this figure may be valid for
a particular program, but there are many counter-examples. The
size of savings and losses from dual sourcing varies. The fact is
that the government must pay for introducing a second supply source
in the form of initial investment, loss of economies of scale, and
inflated prices for the minimum sustaining rate. Therefore,
whether or not the government can realize savings from dual
sourcing a major weapon system depends on the economic condition
of the aerospace and ordnance industries. If the suppliers do
engage in price competition, savings from the lower prices must be
larger than the price the government paid for introducing the
second source.
Understanding the myths and facts of major weapon system
procurement is crucial in setting acquisition policies. Under a
competitive bidding environment, as currently assumed by dual
source procurement policy, the contractor can charge what the
market will bear. On the other hand, under a monopoly environment,
the contractor must substantiate all cost figures. Since dual
source procurement is in reality closer to monopoly than to
competition, regulations must be modified to eliminate those
structural deficiencies of the current system.
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In addition to separating myths from facts, our analyses of
dual source competition policy also provide additional insights
into contractors' pricing decision processes. We believe that
these additional insights can shed some light on the direction of
future policy studies. Clearly, the numerous attempts by the
government to develop a method to quantify potential savings (as
opposed to potential savings as well as losses) from dual source
competition were misdirected. Our analysis shows that it is
possible to determine the optimal timing to introduce a second
source (or not to introduce it at all) , but it would be futile to
assume only savings result and then attempt to estimate the size
of potential savings.
We believe that future policy research should focus on other
viable alternatives to enhance competition at the major system




1. Public Law 98-369.
2. Johnson, R. E., and J. W. McKie, "Competition in the Repro-
curement Process," Memorandum RM-5657-PR, Santa Monica, CA,
Rand Corporation, 1968, p. 1.
3. "The Economics of Military Procurement," Subcommittee on
Economy in Government, Joint Economic Committee, 1969.
4. President's Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management,
"Report to the President," June 1986.
5. In FY 1985, noncompetitive contracts awarded by DoD totaled
$96 billion (underline original) , see General Accounting
Office, "Report to the Committee on Government Operations,
House of Representatives," September 18, 1986.
6. Such studies may be found in the references of the below-cited
papers.
7. See William C. Cohen, "The Competition in Contracting Act,"
Public Contract Law Journal . Vol. 14, No. 1 (October 1983),
pp. 1-39.
8. See Willis. R. Greer, Jr., and Shu S. Liao, "Competitive
Weapon Systems Procurement: A Summary and Evaluation of
Recent Research," National Contract Management Journal ,
(Winter 1984), pp. 37-47; Sherbrooke and Associates, "Quantit-
ative Acquisition Strategy Models," March 1983, Potomac, MD;
K. A. Archibald, A. J. Harman, , M. A. Hesse, J. R. Hiller and
G. K. Smith, "Factors Affecting the Use of Competition in
Weapon System Acquisition," R-2706DR&E, Rand Corporation,
February 1981.
9. See M. N. Beltramo and D. W. Jordan, "A brief Review of
Theory, Analytical Methodology, Data, and Studies Related to
Dual Source Competition in the Procurement of Weapon Systems,"
Headquarters, Naval Material Command, August 1982; W. R.
Greer, Jr., and S. S. Liao, "An Analysis of Risk and Return
in the Defense Market: Its Impact on Weapon System Competi-
tion," Management Science , Vol. 32, No. 10 (October 1986), pp.
1259-1273; Sherbrooke and Associates, op cit.
10. C. F. Wheeler, Advanced Concepts in Cost Estimating , The
Technical Marketing Society of America, 1984.
18
11. For detailed discussion of these strategies, see Dan C Boger
and Shu S. Liao, "Quantity-Split Strategy under Two-ContractorCompetitive Procurement Environment," Technical Report NPS-54-88-008, Monterey, CA, Naval Postgraduate School, August198 8.
19
Table 1
Relationship Between Savings and Economic Environment
(1) (2) (3)
Savings or Time Period





Rockeye Bomb 25.5 1972-73
Bullpup AGM-12B 18.7 1961-64
Shillelagh Missile (4.7) 1968-69
Sparrow AIM-7F (25.0) 1977-80
MK-4 6 Torpedo (30.9) 1966-69












# From Beltramo and Jordan, 1982.
20
Figure 1
Capacity Utilization & Dual Sourcin^








1954 1959 196 i 1969

















ti ( i o% Confidence;
60% -







>0 60 70 80 90 100 110
Cost (SI, 000)
120 130 140 150
22
Figure 3











Cumulative Quant it v
23
Distribution List
Agency No. of copies
Defense Technical Information Center 2
Cameron Station
Alexandria, VA 22314
Dudley Knox Library, Code 0142 2
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, CA 93943




Library, Center for Naval Analyses 1
4401 Ford Avenue
Alexandria, VA 22302-0268








Professor Shu S. Liao 20
Code 54 Lc
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, CA 93943
24


